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A Metaphor for Trust: the “Umbrella Effect” in Global Science*



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Abstract. The purpose of the article is to consider the foreign experience in conceptualization and study of trust, to provide a critical review of the multidisciplinary issues of trust in modern world science, the relevance of which is explained by the increasing shortage of public trust. The research novelty of the study lies in the identification of forms, types, and trends in the subject area of trust in terms of determining the internal and interdisciplinary boundaries of various humanitarian fields. The interdisciplinary subject of trust in terms of the “umbrella effect” of competing paradigms and approaches is presented; the definition of trust as a multidimensional construct is conceptualized; the category-concept set of classification of trust include variables: resource pools (availability and configuration); rules of the game (resource share and coordination); target functions (efficiency, productivity); functions focused on people (social roles and practices, interpersonal relations); sense-making (realistic and perceived effect); focus on action (practical effects); focus on perception (interpretive effects). Trust as a choice addresses theoretical issues in specific contexts between the trustee and the trusted; metaphors such as “shadows of the future”, “vulnerability”, “leap of faith” reveal signs of a trust continuum in an uncertain situation; identification of the tension of trust as its natural and ambivalent property between altruism and self-interest associated with control and differentiation of prospects, acquires the meaning of trust dimension in a variety of institutional contexts. The results can be applied in the following fields: scientific, educational, management, information, and analytical..

Key words: interdisciplinary approach, definitions, trust, a multi-dimensional design, classifications, “umbrella structure”, models, types.

1. Introduction. The study of foreign experience in conceptualizing and studying trust, the results of recent (2017 and 2018) studies in many countries show that generalized trust and institutional trust are at their historically low levels; levels of public trust in institutions, business, NGOs, the media and individuals have fallen to record low levels [1 (Edelman, 2018); 2 (Gallup, 2018); 3 (Pew Research Center, 2018)]. Due to negative performance of manifestations of trust at different levels and in various humanitarian fields, it is concluded that the role of trust in the society is radically underestimated [4, p. 219] and the failures of trust reflect serious social shortcomings.

Trust is an interdisciplinary phenomenon but within each discipline there is its own specialization for studying trust issues. In modern economic science, the understanding of trust depends on the selected basic

prerequisites. Depending on whether it is a version of tradition of the empirical rational choice theory of the Chicago school (G. Becker, H. Demsetz, G. Stigler, F.H. Knight, H. Simons, M. Friedman, A. Harberger) or a competing version of the scientific tradition of the axiomatic rational choice of the Princeton school of economics (P. Krugman, H. Leibenstein, F. Machlup, O. Morgenstern, J. von. Neumann, J. Nash, T. Sargent, C. Sims) the focal points and boundaries of the “theory of trust” will be very diverse. In trust psychology, there are four different basic approaches to trust: as a behavioral intention or internal action similar to choice, judgment or preference; as an expression of trustworthiness where trust is studied in contexts of personal characteristics inspire positive expectations of trustworthiness on the part of the others (“the outsiders”); as an individual’s property that develops at an early age and remains relatively stable through

adulthood; as a synonym to cooperation or risk taking expression [5, p. 909].

Similar problems of creating adequate mental constructions on “topics and limits of trust” exist in anthropology, history, management, political science, sociology, philosophy, economics, ethics, and other behavioral sciences; the set of disciplines is indicated based on the number of scientists in relevant research areas at three international conferences on trust in 2016–2017 [6; 7; 8].

The purpose of the article is to present a critical review of the multidisciplinary problems of trust in the modern world science. The research *objectives*: to identify a set of key features identifying forms, types, and trends in trust; to assess the interdisciplinary boundaries in trust.

The article is based on *the hypothesis* that the set of relevant features of subject areas of trust can be developed based on system analysis, modern data of empirical and theoretical studies, and be presented through metaphors of trust in a concentrated form. The authors cover uncertainties, risks, and difficulties in various disciplines in determining the concepts of trust, including in the context of post-modernity or reflexive modernization. One of the examples of genesis of trust is the emergence of the meaning of trust as a resource through the transformation of its structure [9].

Features of applied methodology and research methods

The article uses methods of contextual analysis and selection of ideas drawn from the discussions of speeches, “included observation and participation”, from articles and monographs of leading scientists, experts, and researchers, as well as analysis of metaphors [10]. The authors focus on structural and functional analysis, understanding sociology and phenomenology [11], integration of

these components as parts of theories into a single semantic space. The functional aspects of different levels and types of trust are systematized (see *Tab. 1*) with examples of operationalization of micro-levels of trust and mistrust (see *Tab. 2*).

The article is organized as follows: after the introduction, a literature review is offered, which traces the subject boundaries of trust. Then the authors briefly cover the most important approaches that were proposed at three international scientific conferences on trust. This is followed by a brief review of literature on trust in special areas. It is demonstrated how relevant characteristics of trust were determined from the point of view of establishing internal and interdisciplinary boundaries between the humanities. One of the main conclusions is formulated as one of the metaphors of trust – the “umbrella effect” in the global science.

2. Literature review

Among many *sociological* interpretations of trust the dominating approaches are those developed within the framework of rational choice theories (J. Coleman [12]), systems theory (N. Luhmann [13–16]), structuration theory (A. Giddens [9; 17]), social action based on scientific tradition of M. Weber (for example, M. Endreß [18]); “culture of trust” as a macro-sociological prospect for social change (P. Sztompka [19–21]), “moral trust” (E. Uslaner [22–23]).

The understanding of the fact that the use of the term trust greatly varies in different scientific fields (for example, R. Seppanen, K. Blomqvist, and S. Sundqvist identify more than 70 definitions of trust [24]), and can be contradictory even within a single discipline with competing paradigms, leads to the choice of the basic concept. The chosen theoretical foundation for studying trust is the

system analysis and the neo-systems theory by N. Luhmann [25, p. 1]. Moreover, the methodology to analyze the “metaphor of trust” was applied [26, p.149]. In this context, we analyzed one of the best historical monographs on the topic of “metaphors of trust” by J. Hosking – *Trust: A History* which traces the genesis of trust [27].

Classic sociologists justify the concepts of trust based on the recognition of the theory of social reproduction of the modern world, where people act amid incomplete information, risk and potential undesirable changes, which makes trust necessary. E. Goffman perceived the concept of trust as an action-related dependence on the evidence of others, based on assumptions about the unity of their moral qualities, drawing attention to the pre-reflexive, functioning and inaccessible knowledge of trust [28]. Continuing this theoretical line, E. Giddens applied the terminology of “structuring social context”, distinguishing “personality trust” (trust “between familiar people”) and “trust for abstract systems” as products of “late modernism”. Revealing the essence of modern institutions, A. Giddens noticed a trend: the importance of institutions is becoming “a faith in the correctness of principles of which nobody knows” [9, p. 33]. The use of categories for the analysis of less known subjects led to the crossing of inter-subject boundaries. For example, the “climate change policy” is opened by the “Giddens paradox” in relation to the problem of risks of climate change: if these risks are still intangible, mediated, and invisible in everyday life, very few face them seriously, [17, pp. 2–3, 7–9]. “Critical or active trust” is increased if more citizens scrutinize knowledge requirements and critically analyze expertise. Describing the concept of “double structuration”, Giddens includes not only the existence of rules involved in production of social systems, but

also “resources” themselves [9, p. 68]. Thus, a “resource” was included in the structure of trust.

Thus, assessing the discussion, classic sociologists may reveal different theoretical nuances in the concept of trust. J. Coleman developed its rational-reflexive version, A. Giddens covered trust primarily in terms of “double structuration”; E. Goffman emphasized the socio-integrative function of action in the context of trust, N. Luhmann was attracted by the prospects for the development of trust in the context of managing social complexity.

The subject boundaries of “trust”

Classifications of approaches to various sociological schools show that the ideas of trust among classic researchers represent a fairly broad theoretical spectrum. As pointed out by A. Seligman, “the use of the term trust tends to be loose and inaccurate as it varies from the micro to the macro levels, is used to express the basic ideas of Durkheim’s solidarity to confidence coupled with ideas of iteration in interactions” [29, p. 28].

There is a well-known N. Luhmann’s metaphor about trust as a connection (a hinge joint, a “Scharnier”) between diverse systems, which is capable of reducing complexity, stabilizing expectations and increasing system capabilities of people’s actions. N. Luhmann pointed out that trust is a versatile tool: it maintains the decision-making process within the “controlled borders”, making many sources of tension surmountable [15, 20]. According to this view, in complex behavioral and risky situations, individual action paradoxically becomes predictable; “rules of conduct” become socially restrictive. Thanks to such expectations many people reduce behavior to quite simple examples that are easy to understand and predict by themselves and others.

Preferences are considered equivalent to expectations in the economy; they denote the propensities of an individual that relate to their consumption according to the theory of rational choice [30]. Following this logic, the term “trust” means rationality of consent when two or more contracting parties are the maximizers of utility. Based on this theory, R. Hardin developed the concept of trust as “encapsulated interest”. The meaning of the latter lies in the fact that every individual has the desire to trust and continue the relationship that is especially valuable [31, p. 88]. The concept of trust at the level of interpersonal relations describes the expectations of the trustee (bezugspersonen) and the trustor (vollmachtgeber); their actions should be based on common values and moral beliefs. In the theory of rational action there are similar, yet somewhat different terms: a principal as a decision-maker contrasted to an agent acting as the executor of decisions.

Analysis of the semantic field of trust reveals its fundamental duality: pragmatic and moral. E. Uslaner tried to reveal the features of “moral” trust in the framework of the sociological theory [23]. E. Uslaner introduced this term as trust for some “generalized other”, “a stranger”, without expecting anything specific in return, realizing a commandment: “treat others well even in the absence of reciprocity” [23, p.18] and realizing E. Kant’s categorical imperative as an instruction related to the moral due: “We should trust each other” [23, p. 23]. But the paradox is that moral independence leads to *ethical vulnerability* which can only be protected by the principles of honor, respect, and dignity. It is noteworthy that there is a similar point in psychology: in the well-known definition of D. Rousseau (and co-authors) the main semantic *psychological reference point* of the definition of trust is

the following “... a psychological state that includes the desire to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations of intentions or behavior of another individual” [32, p. 395]. In our opinion, in these definitions, the ethical and psychological definitions of trust are substantially close. The difference between the concepts of trust and hope is that hope, although it includes the possibility of negative consequences of the course of events, is focused only on a positive result while trust is much more than hope, trust has a complex structure. The foundations of trust in a wide variety of approaches and theories are supported by credibility, reliability, authenticity, and other values. People are interested in trust and reliability, which helps cooperate for mutual benefit. Cooperation is a priority objective but there are numerous examples of cooperation that do not require and are probably not related to trust.

The purpose of the article is to clarify and shed light on how trust is studied and evaluated in various subject areas. To achieve it let us turn to the experience of analyzing ideas on trust at relatively recent international conferences.

Review of three international scientific events on trust

It is important to note the contribution of new ideas and experience to the study of trust by participants of conferences in Tokyo (“Trust Research from Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives”, November 18–20th, 2017 [6]; at a research seminar on interdisciplinary prospects of trust at University of Nebraska-Lincoln (USA) followed by publishing a book in 2016 [7]; and the study of trust as a risk based on reports of the European Union expert group (Luxembourg, 2017) which presented medium-term consequences for policies and institutions in case of a decrease in the level and quality of trust [8].

At the conference “Trust” in Tokyo P. Sztompka proposed to start from the “six moral ties constituting the basis of the moral space: loyalty, reciprocity, solidarity, respect, justice, and confidence” [33]. Sztompka formed a theoretical and metaphorical construct in which “trust builds a bridge over the sea of uncertainty”. B. Noteboom (Netherlands) drew attention to the fact that the definition of trust is still ambiguous and confusing. Noteboom noted that if we look at any cooperation we inevitably face the problem of cost savings: the search for information about the partner, alternative transactions, product prices; characteristics of a transaction subject; negotiations and processes of signing a contract; protection of a contract from infringement by third parties; monitoring compliance with the terms of the contract between the partners. There was a discussion about some economists’ statements. For example, O. Williamson argued that trust is impossible in market conditions [34]. According to Williamson, trust in markets only makes sense if it does not go beyond personal interests. Noteboom did not agree with this statement. Indeed, any business prioritizes personal interest, profit, but there is also a place for something similar to trust. Amid radical uncertainty, confidence-building is an investment transaction. As an economist, Noteboom put the theories of transaction costs and opportunistic behavior in trust on the foreground; as a sociologist, he insisted that trust is the basis of the society; a full understanding of trust requires an appropriate combination of components of economy, sociology, social psychology, and cognitive science. R. Bachmann defined the current situation with trust as a tectonic shift in understanding and interpreting organizational and socio-economic conditions [35]. R. Salerno in a report made an assessment of

new ways of trust operationalization. Here the concept of “trust” is a good example of the general case that the anthropologist C. Lévi-Strauss called “floating signifier” [25, p. 11]. According to R. Salerno, the phenomenon of “floating signifiers” in sociology of trust has a deep fundamental meaning just like “the other”, “the stranger” became the central philosophical and socio-cultural categories that define the other as a “not me” [26].

G. Möllering distinguished four parts of main problems of trust in management: “old/new; real/big”. The solution to the “old” problem answers the questions: “How can systems trust systems?”. The solution to the “new” problem involves answering questions about the reflexivity of inter-organizational trust: “How can systems avoid the “dark sides” of trust?; What is meant by the concepts of unwanted, dysfunctional or false trust, excessive or optimal trust?” The solution of “real” problems is associated with self-reinforcing inter-organizational trust processes. When it comes to “big” trust issues, Möllering described the phenomena of “trust traps” demonstrating feedback and self-reinforcement cycles: general and inter-organizational; traps of opportunities, obligations, bureaucratic cycle, dependence on the organizational path and critical moments of development. According to Möllering, the problem of critical ties in trust relations is particularly relevant in cases where perception of reliability turns into trust practices and the willingness to be vulnerable turns into an actual state of helplessness [36–38]. At this conference, explanations were given as to why processes of reducing the level of social trust in general, trust to governments and opposition parties in particular take place in the world and why populism is growing. For example, Brexit and Trump’s election are fraught with people’s deep resentment about their insulted sense of

national identity. As a result, the motivation to self-identification (“trust in one’s country, preserving the sense of identity”) was stronger than financial motivation (“trust in money”). It was recognized (in Giddens’s terms) that the elites did not outline the correct “risk profile”.

The Multidisciplinary symposium and interdisciplinary seminar (University of Nebraska-Lincoln, USA) was focused at finding theoretical and methodological integration of trust components. As a result, a scientific monograph was published in 2016 with the publication of 12 best articles reflecting the multi-level concepts of trust [7]. The correlation between legitimacy, procedural justice and cooperation in the context of sociology, political science, criminology, and the impact of political polarization on institutional trust were discussed; as well as disciplinary and contextual differences between using trust [7]. Participants noted that the experience gained accumulated by the participants of Trust seminars at University of Nebraska was “tough, mind-blowing and frustrating”, that interdisciplinary work is required, but it is rarely done within studies of trust [7].

The third area of review is the study of trust based on reports of the EU expert group (Luxembourg, 2017) who presented assessments of addressing social problems based on the concept of “trust in reliability” as opposed to the alternative concept of “trust in risk”, expert assessments of the medium-term consequences for policies and institutions in case of a decreased level and quality of trust in various countries [8]. The concept of *function of trust* refers to the key provisions initiated by the European Commission to rebuild the citizens’ trust in the European project [8, p. 18]. The possible consequences of the destruction and collapse of trust in various areas

are demonstrated. It is argued that democracies in many countries are under threat because there is no clear understanding of where the “boundaries of trust” lie. When social trust is destroyed the social fabric is rebuilt towards lower-level entities and institutions which then create rigid impenetrable boundaries around themselves; then trust tends to re-focus on another center of power: a political party, a religious movement, an ethnic group, a regional leader, a chief-type leader, a strong military leader or an economically powerful figure; such groups and their leaders set rigid boundaries increasing distrust even more. Any push towards a murderous conflict may become insoluble; this can be seen in examples of what is happening in Ukraine and in the Middle East [8, p. 14]. It must be recognized, however, that the deepest and most fundamental causes and circumstances of such “dark scenarios for the destruction of trust” have not yet been fully studied.

An overview of ideas and search for interdisciplinary boundaries of trust from handbooks

We study and compare the general contexts of trust, identifying their boundaries, starting from economy, moving to sociology and social theory, psychology and philosophy, management and history, and then – specialized publications on trust and social capital.

In the Oxford reference textbook *Political Economy*, the latter is treated as a relation between economy and politics: the economic approach itself called public choice which distinguished individual rationality, and the sociological approach, the analysis of which was purely institutional [39, p. 4]. Trust through these three approaches reflects contextual problems (whom the voters know and trust); games in the context of preparing and arranging voters’ registration; forms of

trust between politicians and bureaucrats, the theory of asymmetric information. The debate from the standpoint of “political economy” of trust led to the development of blocks of risk issues of moral damage coupled with the focus of actors on different interests, group choice and decisions on the possibility of cooperation. For example, the use of distrust in the logic of terror was demonstrated, which is especially important today [39, p. 33, 144, 258, 291, 698, 863, 976, 1006].

The reference book on modern growth economy [40] concludes that the fundamental reasons for long-term growth are the institutions of trust, “high confidence balance with high quality” are also important. In this regard, the trust factor is viewed as an element of institutional choice, especially when concluding and executing contracts. Such logic leads us to the term of “collective reputation” which ensures success and prosperity for the society. The concepts of “dysfunctionality” or “non-adaptability” are presented as opposite, where agents adopt a system of beliefs or methods of action related to rent-oriented behavior, corruption, culture of trust only to relatives or members of their families and refuse to cooperate in a broad context [40, pp. 303–304, 364–365, 402–404, 430, 519].

Modern microeconomic approaches represented by traditional topics of consumer choice, supply and demand, production [41; 42], use various game-theoretic models; studies of prerequisites of the model of trust of *homo reciprocans* [41, p. 56, 257, 264, 301, 313], assessment of irrational economic behavior in the context of trust and distrust, the subject of patent rights and antimonopoly laws [42, p. 93, 451–458, 529, 580].

The publication on modern behavioral economics is devoted to the problems that could not be solved by traditional approaches,

accumulating the conclusions of psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, legal experts, and biologists [43]. Trust was presented in the terms of structure of personality and is studied in the context of biological and neurological systems. In behavioral economics, models of trust can be applied to new challenges of global trade and business based on self-respect and respect for others, dynamic interaction of an individual and empathy, if trade is carried out without threats of conflict [43, p. 33, 142–146, 152, 261, 268, 339, 400–418, 458–463, 654].

Analyzing the paradigm of trust in the mainstream of new institutional economics it is necessary to emphasize that its central modern issue is the problem of destructing human interaction caused by the inability to sustain the reliability of responsibilities of people and institutions [44]. The issue of trust is of key importance as lack of credible commitments destroys three types of human interaction: economic exchange, relations between voters and politicians, and social contract. The problems in each area of credible commitments are solved through social standards that invoke trust and reliability. In order to explain the emergence and sustainability of credible actions or joint behavior in “principal-agent” relations or voluntary provision of public goods, purely sociological phenomena such as dynamics of social ostracism or participation in dense horizontal networks are studied. Standards of trust as products of repetitive games and formal institutions are considered to be the toughest institutions yet they vary widely between countries, having a significant impact on economic results. The culture of trust between strangers is ensured through networks of associations that help overcome problems related to collective action, which is also in line with the topic of social capital. The metaphor of trust in new institutional economy is mainly

related to decisions of rational actors, the costs and benefits that they take into account when making choices based on social norms. The latter, in contrast to sociology, are more limited to be used for solving the problems of collective action [44, pp. 16–17, 108–109, 180, 213–214, 614–628, 684, 702–721].

Publications on social studies of rational choice [45] and comparative institutional analysis [61] present the problems of trust in much more specific and therefore more interesting contexts. Studies of rational choice consider the concepts of trust together with reliability, give the results of different situations, and study trust in game-theoretic models where expectations about costs and benefits largely depend on stereotypes of social groups (status, race, gender, age). Trust is interpreted as a “shadow of the future”; the main feature of the two-actor social dilemma is understood as a “conflict” between individual and collective rationality. In economics such conflict is called “the problem of public goods”; in sociology it is a situation of “the problem of collective action”; in political science – a “tragedy of common heritage”. When analyzing trust valuable peculiarities are revealed: repeated negotiations, as a rule, stimulate opportunistic behavior since an unexpected unforeseen situation usually strengthens the negotiating positions of one partner and weakens the positions of the other; strong reciprocity can lead to a situation of neglect of trust; trust is strengthened by the results of actions of rational actors who consider the long-term effects of their behavior [45, pp. 48–51, 60–74, 114–117, 122–127].

The Oxford edition of comparative institutional analysis [46] shows how forms, outcomes and dynamics of an economic organization (company, network, market) relate to other social institutions (e.g.,

educational systems, policies, rights, etc.) and the consequences for economic growth, innovation, employment and inequality. A comparative approach was applied to these issues. The editors are very concerned about the “delineation of boundaries” from the “common area of interest” represented by a number of debates, concepts, and arguments that are substantially similar yet different from other subject areas [46, pp.1–3]. Here contracts are covered in relation to trust, as well as short- and long-term opportunism, relations between employees and employers; law, networks, types of state and features of political environment, and institutional regimes. The ratio of types of trust and market models and non-market relations are presented; the impact of trust on the dynamics of macroeconomic indicators through institutions is analyzed. It is recorded that low levels of trust are often associated with predator states and unpredictable financial systems [46, pp. 47–48, 93, 123, 213–218, 285, 378, 468–482, 533, 618].

In the Oxford reference book on analytical sociology, the subject area is briefly defined as “strategy of understanding social world” [47]. It is argued that theorists and practitioners greatly underestimate the concept of trust as a framework for action based on signaling theory. Trust interacts with informal monitoring mechanisms; the challenge is how trust affects, undermines, and supports them. The consequences of trust at the macro-level are of deep interest for analytical sociology. The decline in trust (of individuals and institutions) is especially frequent [47, pp. 83–87, 160–169, 173–180, 185–188]. Analytical sociology explains trust through detailing the mechanisms which produce social facts; these mechanisms are always related to individuals’ actions and relations binding the actors.

The intellectual framework of economic sociology is related to the epigrammatic definition of its classic researchers as “a sociological perspective applied to economic phenomena” [48, pp. 3–5]. *Economic anthropology* is defined as “a description and analysis of economic life from an anthropological perspective”. Anthropologists perceive and describe trust, just like other social and cultural phenomena, through ambivalent behavioral patterns as actual patterns of behavior [50, pp. 1–2].

When considering reflexive and functioning trust, the concept of a leap of faith can act as a dividing line [36; 49]. The relations between these two types of trust reflects an ongoing search for a balance between trust, understood as reliability, resting on the routine of daily actions (reflexive trust), and trusting actions under uncertainty (functioning trust). Quantitative measurements and assessments of relations of trust measure only reflexive confidence (reflexive trust) cannot be easily perceived as relevant to behavior. When using the concept of functioning trust it is primarily a sociological interpretation of the structural ambivalence of trust that we are talking about. Therefore there is a need to distinguish levels of reflection of trust in action. It is necessary to understand the importance of forms, growth rates and distribution of “radii of trust” of people “acting on the other side”. At the level of theoretical understanding of modern society and its structures, the role of “intermediate” types of trust, as well as the phenomenology of trust within the framework of general social changes, increases. Finally, it is important to clarify the determinants of social trust, taking into account the income dynamics and social status, especially in view of the growing trend towards group selfishness (isolation) and certain ideas of justice (in the versions of

“friend–foe”). There is also a need to expand the concept of knowledge by covering the phenomenological perspective and analyzing the semantic structures of the background knowledge. In this regard, functioning trust appears as an alternative to reflexive trust, and the interpretation of a person’s attitude to their own actions and beliefs, where their trust in their rightness is manifested, contrasts with the analysis of the semantic structures of background knowledge. If trust is presented as a specific mode of relations, as a certain connection, then the properties of this connection described in the concepts of reflexive and functioning trust can be due to the confrontation of routine actions and actions that deviate from the standard. At this point, we come to an understanding of trust in sociology, economics and anthropology as a choice which helps solve theoretical issues in a specific context, use metaphors as “shadows of the future”, vulnerabilities and opportunities due to a “leap of hope”.

The semantic load and content of reflexive and functioning trust is related to the problems of individual’s radical uncertainty, the tension of trust and its ambivalent property between altruism (solidarity) and self-interest coupled with personal interest and control.

Discussion of results

A critical analysis of the theoretical positions of classic and modern foreign researchers has helped us understand that trust can be determined by a number of heterogeneous features interconnected by different justifications (*Tab. 1*). Different levels and types of trust can be reflected on different analytical platforms, in particular, basic theoretical approaches as fundamental systems of access in the framework of structural and functional analysis or phenomenological approach (E. Husserl, A. Schütz), systems theory (N.

Table 1. Functional aspects of different levels and types of trust

Levels	Types	System functions and models of realization	Meaning-making contexts
Mega- and macro-	Systemic trust	Reduction of complexity, free information flow; facilitate the exchange of information; effect of generic rules	Systemic contexts that shape the repertoires of meanings; fundamental institutional design; system reputation of the institutions
	Societal trust	Institutional impartiality of credibility of action; interpersonal trust understood generally; societal trust as generalized trust	Societal communication; societal rules of reciprocity; institutional design of government forms
	Abstract trust	Behavior of parties in the context of anonymous social structures, directed mutual expectations, providing stable patterns of interaction	Contexts of generalized norms and rules of business conduct; context of trust as institutional forms;
	Moral trust; ethic trust; culture trust	Patterns moral of the trust; setting to "morally decent" of the trust; guarantee trust effect by moral principles; models of trust rooted in this type of culture; problems of moral hazard; morality as a matter of rationality; moral rationalism emphasizes hypothetical agreement	Moral, political and socio-economic mutual expectations of cooperation; moral generators of repertoires of meaning; moral hazard and opportunism; "morality arises from market failure" when rational behavior of market actors who adequately react to information produced by the market does not ensure Pareto-optimality.
	Institutional trust	Models of institutional trust; functions of institutions that form patterns of behavior	Institutional decision-making styles; repertoire of meaning
Meso-	Regional trust	Cultural features embedded in each member of the regional community; distinctive features of regional identity; R. Putnam conceptual twist: social capital as a property of local communities; meso rules	Signs of cultural embeddedness; institutional design of local governance; regional indicators of the institutional level as signs of meso rules)
Micro-	Group trust	Realization of values, goals, special interests of specific groups; equivalents of transitivity of a trade name; organizational context	Identification-based, organizational and systemic-interactionist contexts of goals, values, and interests of the specific groups
	Personality trust	Realization of values, goals, special interests of personality;	Identification of expectations, promises, preferences, limitations, intentions, obligations providing reciprocity ties

Luhmann), one of the versions of understanding sociology (M. Weber, G. Simmel) or versions of ethnomethodological approaches (H. Garfinkel) studying everyday standards and rules of behavior, the meanings of a language in the framework of everyday interaction or the desire for mutual understanding in social processes. Trust is differentiated by micro-, meso-, and macro-level with the analysis of specific processes of generation. Fundamental values in their possible differences are thematic, reflexive, rational, emotional, relational,

business, and functioning type of trust (trust as action); between explicit and implicit forms or functions of trust. There are fundamental differences between interpersonal, institutional and systemic types of trust and their mutual relations with each other. The possible combinations of these features and types provide a variety of forms of trust representation. For example, at the micro-level, we have identified four systems of operationalization for sociology, psychology, economics, and related sciences (*Tab. 2*). Economic literature identifies

Table 2. Examples of operationalization of micro-levels of trust and distrust

Differentiation of trust levels	Types of trust	System functions of trust (distrust)	Contexts of trust
“Us” – “them”	Trust on the basis of personal devotion or loyalty	Minimizing of existential risk; trust based on clan or religious (sect) affiliation or family connections;	Personal devotion; personal loyalty
Group level	Identity-based trust; interactionist-based trust	Identification with common goals, values, rules, norms; interactions and communications; cohesion; access to common resources social capital that is «owned collectively» and «generated collectively»	Identification-based and interactionist-based contexts of trust; access to social capital resources
	Distrust	Protection from excessive group cohesion, independent decision making, monitoring of processes; overcoming mutual distrust; own experience of discrimination leading to general distrust	Various types of protection against distrust
Level: trustor – trustee	Calculus-based trust; knowledge-based trust	Nucleus of competence for common projects and business models; barrier-free communication; normative guidance	Contexts of rational action models
Level of firms, level of entrepreneurs	Relation-based contracts; trust based on reputation effects	Patterns of trust: “norm of generalized reciprocity” leading to general expectation of feedback, which later returns to a “virtuous circle”; The cycle of “ <i>virtuous circle</i> ”; rewards from past interactions should help expand cooperation networks, which contributes to further cooperation	Firms with shared resources; pool institutions; reputation institutions; growing joint projects
	Opportunism; opportunistic behavior	Opportunistic behavior as achievement of own interests fraudulently, including explicit forms of lies: slyness, trickery, guile, theft, fraud, betrayal (O. Williamson)	Guarantees of relation-based contracts; reputation effects
	Trust as reducing uncertainty	Obligations of trust as a means of reducing uncertainty; building trust through creation of behavioral commitments, refusing other alternatives	Making important commitments as specific means of reducing uncertainty
	Trust as a leap of faith	Identifying the trust boundary, fixing different levels and quality of trust to make appropriate decisions	“Leap of faith” as a volitional overcoming of uncertainty
	Trust as a product	Determining the quality of trust as a “market product” for making appropriate decisions	Trust as a product
	Trust as risk	Risk making it possible to demonstrate its reliability	Situations of different types of risk

mechanisms that help the agent act according to the contract. The main mechanism is to include incentives in such a way that the utility of the agent increases if the contract is fulfilled. At this point there is an important issue of “conceptual differences” between the subject areas of economics and sociology: the tension of trust acts as an ambivalent property inherent in it between altruism (solidarity in terms of Durkheim) and self-interest coupled with self-interest, and the forms of control of this opposition.

In our opinion, G. Hosking’s book *Trust: A History* is important for understanding the boundaries of trust [27]. Its central theme is “trust and distrust” in their social and historical dimensions where the key features of “trust and distrust” are highlighted in a wide variety of societies and in various historic periods. Hosking revealed the causes of the current crisis of trust in various spheres of social life, paying special attention to the historical background of modern problems [27, p. 7]. Although the title of the book contains the word “trust”, it should be referred to more as a “history of distrust”, reconsidering, for example, the period of Stalinism. Hosking recalls that Stalin said: “I do not trust anyone; I do not even believe myself” [27, p. 15]. For the author of the book Stalin’s terror is a catastrophic breach of trust in the country and within state authorities.

Findings and preliminary conclusions

The research results can be presented at the level of “umbrella theory” which presents forms and types of trust from various subject areas, as well as individual cluster such as “binding trust” generating models of binding; “bridge-building trust” producing models of bridging; “coupling trust” generating models of coupling and other types. The peculiarities of the “umbrella effects” of trust are manifested, for example, in the advantages of flexibility in changing the

demand for trust in certain local continuums; in the autonomy and independence of the trustees and the trustor; the differentiation of various products of a trusting relationship. Operationalization of trust as a choice helps solve the theoretical problems of a specific context, understanding the differences between the prospects of the trustor and the trustee; use the metaphors of “shadows of the future”, vulnerability and opportunities due to the “leap of hope”. The semantic load and substantial nature of trust is related to the problem of radical uncertainty of an individual; to tension as an ambivalent property between altruism (solidarity) and self-interest and control; what matters is the extent to which trust is measured and taken into account in a wide variety of institutional contexts.

Common shortcomings of empirical approaches have been revealed. Limited by quantitative measurements of attitudes and thus measuring only reflexive confidence, they are not perceived as relevant to behavior and are only of very specific interest in the subject of trust. The main difficulties in determining the interdisciplinary boundaries of *trust* have been identified. The ever-growing interest in trust and in related groups of concepts such as social capital, faith, respect, recognition, confidence, associativity, social cohesion, legitimacy, vulnerability, and civil society is closely connected to the widespread problems of late modernity: risks and security, complex societies, diminishing importance of state as a community based on common standards and values.

A number of significant events in recent decades have literally shaken people’s trust – in each other, in institutions, organizations, and states. One of the unpleasant consequences of the global crisis of 2008 is the inertia of public cynicism towards the established moral

standards, public goods, cultural values, and trust. However, the current lack of public confidence cannot be attributed solely to the effects of the financial crisis as it has also increased due to many failures affecting governments, regulators, companies, and corporations.

A healthy society relies on the recognition that politics is not a natural environment for strong trust relations and therefore there is reasonable distrust towards others, especially

those who are powerful and affluent. Progressive social systems provide citizens with many opportunities to supervise those who are endowed with such power and authority, thereby institutionalizing distrust. At the same time, public trust is a social building block of collective action. For this reason any public authority cannot survive without trust. Any public institutions depend on trust between citizens, sufficient for representation, resistance, and alternative forms of governance.

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